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Trouble on the Friendship 
Express?
Antara Datta
The Maitreyi (Friendship) 
Express, the rail service between 
India and Bangladesh that 
was restarted recently evoked 
nostalgia and hopes for stronger 
ties between the two nations. 
However, it will take more than 
a rail link to deal with fears 
of infiltration by Bangladeshi 
Muslims that is being used in 
aggressive political rhetoric.
On April 14, this year the Bengali new year was ushered in with the reopening of a train link between 
India and Bangladesh after a gap of nearly 
four decades. As the Maitreyi (Friendship) 
Express chugged out of the Kolkata rail-
way station in Chitpur bound for the 
Dhaka Cantonment, there were those who 
argued that it would strengthen bilateral 
relations between the two neighbours. 
The biweekly train that has the capacity to 
carry over 350 passengers and takes about 
12 hours (including the time taken at the 
border), parallels the Samjhauta Express 
that runs between Lahore and Delhi.1 
The train link between Dhaka and 
Kolkata is not the first train between the 
two regions. Prior to 1965 there were three 
trains – the East Bengal Mail, East Bengal 
Express, and the Barishal Express that 
serviced the two halves of the region. 
These were stopped following the 1965 
war. Freight services were resumed in 
1972 but were later discontinued. A bus 
service between Kolkata and Dhaka began 
in 1999 and there are daily flights between 
New Delhi and Kolkata and Dhaka and 
Chittagong. But it was the opening of this 
train link that had many waxing nostalgic 
about a time when the two Bengals were 
not separated by manmade borders2. A 
refugee from East Pakistan, Janatosh Pal 
spoke of how he was six when he left for 
India but that Kalindi, the village he was 
born in Bangladesh, “remained my 
motherland”.3 Such sentiment though was 
not echoed by all. A group calling itself 
the Nikhil Banga Nagarik Sangha (All 
Bengal Citizens’ Committee) opposed the 
opening up of a train link with a country 
they accuse of persecuting Hindus. 
Deep Insecurities
What then does this new train symbolise? 
Does it mark a metaphorical coming 
together of people separated by borders 
they did not create, or is the reality far 
more complicated? A closer look at the 
negotiations and controversies demon-
strates that bilateral relations between 
Bangladesh and India will take more than 
just a train link to heal. Given the sensitive 
nature of discourse regarding any move-
ment of human beings across this fractured 
border, it is unlikely that the train will heal 
deeper prejudices and insecurities. 
When negotiations about the train first 
opened there was friction between the 
two countries when Bangladesh refused 
to accept India’s proposal for a 800-metre 
fence from the border on either side. India 
wanted a box like fence from the border 
crossing point to Gede in the Nadia dis-
trict. Bangladesh objected to both the con-
struction of the fence as well as the term-
ing of any such “fortification” as a “fence”.4 
India’s demand for a fence was a reflection 
of the fear that the train could be used by 
illegal infiltrators including terrorists.5 
The entire discourse about illegal infil-
tration from Bangladesh has several con-
notations. On the one hand, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) has protested in the 
past that vast numbers of Bangladeshis 
are “flooding” the Indian mainland par-
ticularly along the eastern border and 
changing India’s demographic structure. 
In April 1992 the BJP national executive 
passed a resolution blaming the Congress 
Party for not taking action against illegal 
infiltration. There was a call for a rally in 
Calcutta in April 1993 and the BJP issued a 
direct threat that they were willing to tar-
get and expel Bangladeshi workers. This 
rhetoric became particularly strident and 
violent in Mumbai with the Shiv Sena 
picking on a non-Marathi, non-Hindu 
“other”, in this case Muslim Bengalis 
whom they accused of being “infiltrators” 
from Bangladesh. In April 1995 they 
threatened a large-scale deportation of 
such illegals and carried out another 
attempt to do so in April 1998 which pro-
voked international tension between 
Bangladesh and India.6 
‘Infiltrators’ and ‘Refugees’
This is not to say that there has not been 
illegal migration from across the border, 
particularly of a labour force that does not 
accept the sanctity of the international 
boundary. India has in the past repeatedly 
expressed concern about the presence of 
illegal immigrants and the porous border 
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between the two countries.7 However 
what is striking about this political dis-
course is that only Muslims who cross the 
border illegally are “infiltrators” and 
deserve to be sent back, whereas Hindus, 
who cross the border, more often than not, 
illegally, are “refugees” who deserve the 
sympathy and protection of the Indian 
nation. Such a belief mirrors the two- 
nation theory that saw east and west Paki-
stan as a homeland for the Muslims, and 
assumes that India then would be a simi-
lar homeland for Hindus. 
Indian law does not recognise “refu-
gees” as a distinct legal category. All who 
cross a border into India are either citizens 
and thereby have a valid right to do so, or 
“aliens” who fall under the 1946 Forei-
gner’s Act. Any non-citizen who enters the 
country without a visa is technically an 
“illegal infiltrator”.8 But in both popular 
and political discourse the term “infiltra-
tor” has come to signify Muslims from 
Bangladesh who cross the border into 
Bengal and Assam, usually in search of 
employment. This then has two implica-
tions. First, it assumes, that all Hindus 
across the world (and particularly those 
from Bangladesh) deserve refuge in India 
as legal residents whether or not they 
cross the border legally. Second, it marks 
out the Muslim who crosses illegally both 
as an illegal migrant and as a Muslim infil-
trator – he is marked both by his legal and 
communal status. It implies that the influx 
of Muslims infiltrates and infects the body 
politic that would otherwise be “pure” and 
free of such contamination. 
The fear that the Maitreyi Express 
would become a conduit for terror and 
illegal workers meant that there had to be 
extensive checks at the border areas lead-
ing to significant delays. Almost five of 
the 12  hours of the journey is spent by 
passengers at the border waiting for 
immigration checks to be completed. 
These delays are perhaps a result of 
bureaucratic incompetence but they also 
reflect a certain official and popular 
unease about a border that can be seen 
as     a “central space where the relation-
ships between state and citizenship, 
between nation and territory, were and 
are being constantly tested and 
negotiated”.9 Post-Partition the eastern 
frontier was not a closed defined space. 
The government of India in 1947, as 
in   2008, remained uneasy about the 
people who were crossing this frontier. 
Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress 
high   command did not think that condi-
tions in east Bengal were particularly 
grave and that the flight of the Hindu 
refugees was a product of baseless and 
imaginary fears, which meant that the 
human flow could be halted, perhaps 
even   reversed.10 The Nehru-Liaqat Pact 
of April 8, 1950 provided for the return 
of   migrants on both sides to their 
original   homelands.11 
The first part of the pact was concerned 
with ensuring equal citizenship rights for 
minorities in both countries while the 
second part attempted to ensure that such 
migrants had freedom of movement along 
with protection in transit and if they 
decided to return to their homes by 
December 31, 1950, they would be entitled 
to the restoration of their immovable 
property, house or land.12 Those refugees 
who came from East Pakistan/Bengal 
between October 1946 and March 1958 
were termed “old migrants” (a total of 
41.17 lakhs) and were eligible for aid but 
those crossing the border between April 
1958 and December 1963 were not eligi-
ble for assistance. In 1952 a passport sys-
tem was introduced and the fear that the 
border would be permanently closed 
pushed up migration. In 1956 the Indian 
authorities tried to install a barrier of per-
mits and migration certificates and finally 
they tried to deter people by not recognis-
ing them as refugees and refusing them 
rehabilitation.13 Following riots in 1964, 
refugees who crossed the border between 
January 1964 and March 1971 were 
termed “new migrants” (a total of 11.14 
lakhs) and relief was to be given only to 
those who agreed to settle outside West 
Bengal. The 6.1 lakhs in West Bengal were 
not eligible for relief and rehabilitation 
benefits.14 The bureaucratisation of the 
border area and the classification of refu-
gees however masked the reality that the 
border was an interstitial space that many 
navigated by evading officialdom without 
needing passports and visas.
Much has been written about how the 
treatment of refugees on the eastern fron-
tier was markedly different from those in 
the east – how refugees in the east were 
not seen as “true refugees”, as opposed to 
the “deserving poor”, the hardworking 
Punjabis, and how the state functioned as 
a benevolent despot deciding what was 
best for the refugee.15 Haimanti Roy has 
argued that these refugees were forced to 
claim and proclaim their victimhood 
before they could claim their nationality.16 
What this particular line of argument 
demonstrates is that in the post-Partition 
period, the concern about the movement 
of people was not a communal question 
since the bulk of the refugees were Hindu. 
By the time of the refugee crisis of 1971 
though, the public and official tone had 
changed somewhat. The government of 
India keen to emphasise that those who 
crossed in 1971 were not going to be con-
sidered for rehabilitation, that they were 
“foreigners” and would be treated as 
such.17 A series of semantic strategies in 
naming and labelling the refugees ensured 
that this was emphasised. However, in 
popular discourse as the number of refu-
gees multiplied, there were increasing 
concerns about the communal nature of 
the problem. The concern was no longer 
about the relief and rehabilitation that had 
not been provided for East Bengali refu-
gees but about the changing communal 
configurations.
Letters to the Amrita Bazar Patrika in 
late April and early May 1971, less than a 
month after refugee crisis had assumed 
serious proportions, reflected this con-
cern. S A Basu from Nagpur wrote to 
express his displeasure at the growing 
numbers of Muslim refugees predicting 
that, “The hope that these refugees will 
return to their own homes as soon as 
normalcy is restored to East Bengal is 
rather a faint hope”.18 A month later an 
anonymous letter to the editor pointed 
out that Hindus in East Bengal had 
been  attacked by those Muslims who had 
subsequently become refugees. “India is 
now thoughtlessly allowing those very 
people to come to West Bengal in their 
millions...Surely India is overdoing 
charity and imperilling (sic) the interests 
of her own people.” Suggesting that 
there   was an insidious plan to plant 
Muslim teachers in West Bengal schools 
in order to subvert and Islamicise the 
education system, the anonymous reader 
predicted that the “Muslim escapees” 
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would soon turn West Bengal into a 
Muslim majority area.19 
In official discourse while the commu-
nal composition of the refugees was never 
publicised, it is believed that Hindus made 
up a bulk of the refugees.20 The govern-
ment was sensitive to any attempts to pub-
licise and potentially exploit the commu-
nal composition of the refugees. The jour-
nal Mother India was prevented from pub-
lishing an editorial on the subject of Mus-
lim refugees titled ‘Refugees or Trojan 
Horses’ that would have suggested that 
Muslim refugees had been sent to deliber-
ately destabilise the country. The govern-
ment of India declared that this would be 
“prejudicial to the maintenance of com-
munal harmony and were likely to affect 
public order” and prohibited the publica-
tion of the editorial under Section 6 of the 
Criminal and Election Laws (Amendment) 
Act of 1969.21
Communalisation of the Border
As a result of this fluid border the fear of 
the “infiltrator” has now become an 
almost accepted part of the political dis-
course about relations between India and 
Bangladesh. This unease is a product of 
actual illegal infiltration, aggressive 
political rhetoric and what can be 
described as the “communalisation” of 
the border. On the day the train set off, a 
group of protestors representing the 
Nikhil Banga Nagarik Sangha disrupted 
its passage at Aranghata in the Nadia dis-
trict. The police blamed the group for 
planting seven crude bombs on the tracks 
that were defused a day before the inau-
guration of the train. The bombs were 
found at Bikramtola near Dhantola by 
local residents who then informed the 
police. The bombs were not powerful 
enough to cause any significant damage 
and were seen as a political statement by 
the group (which denied any association 
with the bombs).22 The leader of the 
group, Subhas Chakrabarti, described 
the train as a “cruel joke” and asked 
“Why should democratic and secular 
India seek to develop such intimate links 
with Islamic Bangladesh, where Hindus 
continue to suffer huge torture, intimida-
tion and dishonour”.23 The group then 
has two distinct demands – first that 
Bangladeshi Hindus who have been 
tortured be rehabilitated properly in 
India. Next, that India take responsibility 
for the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh 
and ensure that it forms a key part of 
bilateral relations. Such demands dem-
onstrate how the refugee/infiltration/
migrant issue remains a thorn in the side 
of both countries. On the one hand, 
groups such as the Sangha locate them-
selves specifically within the Indian nation 
state and demand rehabilitation from it, 
and yet, they claim rehabilitation and 
assistance for those, who in the eyes of the 
state ought to be seen as “forei gners”. Just 
as the discourse about the Muslim migrant 
becoming a terrorist infiltrator while 
taking away scarce jobs from Indians was 
a concern voiced by the Sangha, similarly 
the Hindu migrant was   seen as a legiti-
mate refugee worthy of the protection of 
the Indian state. Thus, in such a discourse, 
the Hindu is twice disadvantaged – first, 
he is being “swamped” by illegal Muslims 
from across the border, and second, he is 
denied the rights that he deserves both as 
a refugee, and as a victim of oppression by 
the Indian state. 
It is patently illogical to suggest that 
illegal migrants attempting to sneak 
across a national boundary would use a 
train that stops for nearly four hours to 
check for visas. The less than stellar record 
of the train since its inception however 
suggests that this fear, however 
un founded, will not come to fruition. 
There have been very few takers for the 
Friendship Express and passengers have 
cited the difficulty in booking tickets, the 
long wait at the border and lack of publi-
city about the train as contributing fac-
tors. Despite the yearning for the past of 
those like Janatosh Pal who would like to 
return to a homeland they left behind 
nearly six decades ago, such nostalgia 
about the movement of people across the 
two halves of Bengal is only one part of 
the story about the Maitreyi Express. In 
fact, the rumblings about the ill-treatment 
of refugees and fears about infiltration 
indicate that it will take more than a train 
to mollify the unease about the flow of 
humanity that has and continues to cross 
the Bengal border. As long as there remain 
disgruntled Hindu refugees in West Ben-
gal and masses in the east seeking a better 
life across the border there will be more 
than a few hiccups along the way for the 
train of friendship. 
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